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FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE
The freedom of the individual from official invasion of his
privacy has long been held to be based upon the fourth amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. Since the turn of the
century there have been a plethora of cases dealing with the inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment. Primary emphasis will here be
given to these cases in an attempt accurately to portray the present
overall interpretation of the amendment within the United States
today. However, understanding the present necessitates a knowl-
edge of the past. To that end a view of the historical setting of
the amendment must precede a discussion of the present inter-
pretation.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The fourth amendment's affirmance of the right of the people
to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and its requirement
of warrants issued upon probable cause came about as a result of
the American colonists' bitter feeling against writs of assistance and
general warrants. Writs of assistance, issued to customs officials to
be used against smugglers, authorized blanket searches upon mere
suspicion. General warrants were search warrants left blank as to
persons and items to be searched for, which were filled in at the
pleasure of the searching officials as they came upon seizable items.
These odious practices were felt to be violative of the fundamental
rights of Englishmen.
Writs of assistance had first been issued under statutes of
Charles II,' and were generally in use in the Colonies from the time
1 An act to prevent frauds and concealments of his Majesty's customs and sub-
sidies (1660), 12 Car. 2, c. 19:
§ 1 [If uncustomed goods are] landed or conveyed away without due
entry thereof first made, and the customer or collector or his deputy agreed
with; then and in such case, upon oath thereof made before the Lord Treas-
urer or any of the Barons of the Exchequer, or chief magistrate of the port
or place where the offense shall be committed, or the place next adjoining
thereunto, it shall be lawful [to and for any of those officers] to issue out
a warrant to any person or persons, thereby enabling him or them, with
the assistance of a sheriff, justice of the peace or constable, to enter into any
house in the day time, where such goods are suspected to be concealed,
and in case of resistance to break open any such houses, and to seize and
secure the same goods so concealed; and all officers and ministers of justice
are hereby required to be aiding and assisting thereunto.
§ 2. Provided always, that no house shall be entered by virtue of this act,
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of the French and Indian War. These writs were violently opposed
by local merchants, although special writs for particular searches,
based upon some proof, did not meet such fierce opposition.
In Paxtons Case,2 James Otis argued that the writs of assist-
ance, being against the fundamental principles of English law and
against natural equity, were therefore void. It was Otis' contention
that an officer of the Crown could enter the home of an accused only
upon reliable information and with a special warrant secured by
going before a magistrate.3 Otis lost the case against the writs, but
it was with his eloquent plea that "the Child Indepedence was
born." 4 In 1765, the right of Englishmen, in England, to be free
from the general warrants was affirmed in the cases of Entick v.
CarringtonA and Wilkes v. Wood.' In these two cases the general
search warrant was condemned as violative of English liberty and
"totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." 7 Lord Camden in
Entick v. Carrington stated:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property is a
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without
my license, but he be liable to an action though the damage be
nothing ...
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest
property; and are so far from enduring a seizure that they will
hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws
unless it be within the space of one month after the offense supposed to have
been committed....
§ 4. Provided also, that if the information whereupon any house shall
come to be searched shall prove to be false, that then and in such case, the
party injured shall recover his full damages and costs against the informer,
by action of trespass to be therefore brought against such informer.
(Emphasis added.) The writs of assistance statute authorized searches upon mere
suspicion rather than upon probable cause. Furthermore, it allowed a search to be
legalized by what it turned up. These two concepts are both foreign to our constitu-
tional system, and it was for these reasons, among others, that the fourth amendment
was enacted.
2 Quincy's Mass. Rep. 51 (1761).
3 Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty is the freedom
of one's house. A man's house is his castle.... This writ, if it should be
declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom-house officers
may enter our houses when they please; we are commanded to permit their
entry ..... whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no
court, can inquire. Bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.
Tudor, Life of James Otis 66-67 (1823), quoted in Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 51-52 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
4 Bowen, John Adams and the American Revolution 217 (1950).
G Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 (C.P. 1765).
6 Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1765).
7 Id. at 1167.
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of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are
removed and carried away, the secret nature of those goods will
be an aggravation of a trespass, and demand more considerable
damages in that respect.8
Another example of the disapprobation in which the general
warrant was held in England at this time can be seen in the speech
of Chatham:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may
blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but
the king of England may not enter; all his forces dare not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement.9
In 1776, the general warrant was declared illegal by Parliament.
The first American precedent 10 for the fourth amendment was
the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 which included a prohibition
against general warrants." Six other states adopted constitutional
provisions prior to 1785 which served as precedents for the draw-
ing of the fourth amendment. 12 The provision most closely approxi-
mating the fourth amendment was section ten of the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights," later copied by Vermont. 4 Section ten was
not merely a condemnation of general warrants, as was the Virginia
8 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066.
9 Quoted in Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 299 n. 4 (1868).
10 For the history leading up to the fourth amendment see Lasson, Development
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937) ; "The First Ten
Amendments To The Constitution," in Sources of Our Liberties 418 (Perry ed. 1957).
11 Adopted by the Williamsburg Convention, June 12, 1776, the Virginia Bill of
Rights, art. X, provided:
That general warrants whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded
to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize
any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly de-
scribed and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought
not to be granted.
See Lasson, op cit. supra note 10, at 79 nn. 1-3.
12 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, § 10 (1776); Maryland Declaration of
Rights, § 23 (1776) ; North Carolina Declaration of Rights, § 11 (1776) ; Vt. Const.,
§ 11 (1777) ; Massachusetts Declaration of Rights art. 14 (1780) ; New Hampshire
Bill of Rights, § 19 (1784). See Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 79-82.
13 That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses, papers, and
possessions free from search and seizure, and therefore warrants without oaths or
affirmation first made, affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any
officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search suspected places, or
to seize any person or persons, his or their property, not particularly described, are
contrary to that right and ought not to be granted. See "Constitution of Pennsyl-
vania" in Sources of Our Liberties, supra note 10, at 330.
14 Vt. Const., § 11 (1777).
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clause, but also sanctified the freedom from search and seizure,
by requiring an oath or affirmation with a sufficient foundation as
a prerequisite to the issuance of a warrant.',
The fourth amendment was not part of the original Constitu-
tion passed by Congress and ratified by the states."6 In response
to the claim of several of the states that a Bill of Rights should
exist, James Madison made nine proposals for a bill of rights to
Congress in the summer of 1789.17 The fourth proposal contained
the basis of the eventually adopted Bill of Rights. The search and
seizure provision contained therein seemed directed solely against
improper warrants.' Interestingly, under the language of Madison's
proposal, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures was not one presently created but one declared already in
existence.'9 Madison's proposals were referred to a Committee of
Eleven, one member from each state, which reported its findings
to the House. According to the available records, the House never
agreed to the fourth amendment in its present form. The provision
reported by the Committee of Eleven 20 contained the phrase "by
warrants issuing" 21 which Mr. Benson declared to be too narrow in
scope, suggesting it be changed to "and no warrant shall issue." 22
The former phrase seems to limit the protection given to no more
than a right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures
pursuant to improper warrants. Mr. Benson's phrase separates the
15 Pa. Declaration of Rights, supra note 13.
16 Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 87-88.
17 Sources of Our Liberties, supra note 10, at 421.
18 The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their
papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched,
or the persons or things to be seized.
See Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 100.
10 Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 100.
20 The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants
issuing without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. See Lasson,
op. cit. supra note 10, at 101.
21 The reason for the seemingly limited scope of the proposed amendment by
Madison and the draft of the Committee of Eleven can be traced to its early purpose
-to combat such practices as the use of general warrants by British officials to en-
force the acts of trade and to search for seditious publications. See Sources of Our
Liberties, supra note 10; Lasson, op. cit. mspra note 10, at 102-05.
22Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 101. There were additional changes in the pro-
posed amendments due to: (1) mistake in phraseology, the word "secured" being
changed to "secure," and (2) the absence of the phrase "unreasonable searches and
seizures" which was in Madison's original draft.
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"reasonableness clause' and the "warrants clause" suggesting that
the two are independent and that the amendment protects both
one's freedom from unreasonable searches, by whatever means,
and one's freedom from the use of improper warrants. This sugges-
tion was defeated by the House, but the Arrangement Committee
(headed by Mr. Benson) included the changed phrase in the re-
ported fourth amendment. All ten amendments were then accepted
by the Senate and later formally enacted by Congress as a wholea2
and ratified by the states.
The experiences of the colonists were undoubtedly "fresh in
the memories of those who achieved our independence and estab-
lished our form of government." 24 Their design in drafting the
fourth amendment was to protect the citizen against intrusion into
his private life in an unreasonable manner, and to allay the well-
grounded fear of the people that the new government might be as
oppressive as the old.25 It is pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting in Harris v. United States,28 that the original concept
of an unreasonable search and seizure was one which was either
warrantless or upon a general warrant, based upon mere suspicion,
or without basis. In other words, the intent of the framers was to
prohibit searches without warrants, searches upon general war-
rants,2 7 and searches made without the proper degree of proof
presented to the judicial officer who was to make the independent
determination. 8
28 Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 103.
24 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
25 The Declaration of Rights of Virginia (1796), provided for prohibition of
the general warrant, and required warrants issued only upon probable cause, or evi-
dence presented to a judicial officer, particularly describing the place of search and
the thing to be searched for. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (1947)
(dissenting opinion). See also I Elliot's Debates (Virginia) 588 (1941 ed.), wherein
it was said by Patrick Henry:
I feel myself distressed because the necessity of securing our personal rights
seems not to have pervaded the minds of men; for many other valuable
things are omitted: for instance, general warrants, by which an officer may
search suspected places without evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize
any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these
are admitted, any man may be seized and any property may be taken in the
most arbitrary manner without evidence or reason. Everything the most
sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong hands of power.
26 331 U.S. 145, 161.
27 See Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 336 (1841).
28 Frisbie v. Butler, Kirby's Rep. 213 (Conn. 1785); Grumon v. Raymond, 1
Conn. 39 (1814). The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, art. XIV, provides:
Every subject has a right to be free from all unreasonable searches and
seizures of his person, his house, his papers, and all his possessions. All
warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of
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Basic to the concept of government espoused by the framers
of the Constitution was the belief that government should never
be an instrument of arbitrary power and tyranny. Thus, the con-
cept of checks and balances found within the fourth amendment is
found as well within the original Constitution.
II. PRESENT SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE
AMENDMENT
The fourth amendment as adopted, lacking an extensive legis-
lative history explaining its selection of words and phrases, has
presented problems of interpretation which have harassed the courts
in their decisions. By the first clause of the amendment all people
seem to be protected from "unreasonable searches and seizures" of
"their persons, papers, houses, and effects." 29 This clause has
become known as the "reasonableness clause."300 The amendment
then declares that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." The second clause is termed the "warrants clause" 31 or the
"probable cause clause." 32 Finally the courts and commentators
have identified both of these clauses with a principle-the right to
privacy.3 3 The relationship that these two clauses and this principle
have to one another has never been fully developed by the Supreme
Court. In looking at the present interpretation by the Court an at-
tempt will be made to determine how the court is treating these
various aspects. It may also be noted that the amendment sets out
various formal requirements-that the probable cause be set forth
by oath or affirmation, and that the warrant particularly describe
the place to be searched or the thing or person to be seized. These
requirements fall within the scope of the probable cause and reason-
ableness clauses respectively and will be treated in the general
discussion of each.
The actual interpretation of the fourth amendment by the
Supreme Court has had a relatively short history: the amendment
lay substantially dormant during the first century following its
them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in
the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places or to arrest
one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied
with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or
seizure; and no warrants ought to be issued but in cases, and with the
formalities prescribed by the laws.
29 Notice the application of unreasonable searches and seizures to persons, papers,
and effects, as well as to houses.
30 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
31 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454 (1963).
32 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 (1959).
83 Lopez v. United States, supra note 31, at 455.
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enactment.84 Then, with increased federal participation in the regu-
lation of interstate commerce and in the criminal process, the fourth
amendment emerged as one of the most frequently invoked pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights.35
Out of the extensive litigation concerning the fourth amend-
ment during the past seventy-five years there have developed five
basic classes of case: (1) arrests with a warrant; (2) search with
a warrant; (3) arrest without a warrant; (4) search without a war-
rant incident to an arrest with or without a warrant; and (5) search
without a warrant not incident to an arrest. These areas will be
treated separately to determine how the Supreme Court looks upon
the aspects of reasonableness, probable cause, and the right to
privacy with respect to each area.30
Arrest Pursuant to a Warrant
The early common law of England seems to indicate that the
arrest warrant was to be procured unless the delay would afford
84 Lasson, op. cit. supra note 10, at 106.
35 Ibid.
36 Federal standards of reasonableness under the fourth amendment have been
made applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In a case in which the Supreme
Court applies the constitutional standard as opposed to the federal supervisory
standard, the action of the Court is as binding upon the state courts as it is upon the
federal courts. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Although it had been
recognized in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), that matters essential to the
right to privacy and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty could be enforced against
the states, the court chose not to do so with respect to the federal exclusionary rule
until 1961. It was not necessary to consider that standard binding upon states until
that time. However, the Court said in Mapp that it would not apply federal standards
of reasonableness to state court proceedings until the states had an opportunity to
formulate their own standards. Thus, after Mapp, the states still had the right to
determine the nature of a reasonable search as part of "the very essence of healthy
federalism." Mapp v. Ohio, mepra at 657. See also Elldns v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 221 (1960).
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), however, the Court stated that it
would apply federal standards of reasonableness to state proceedings.
This Court's long-established recognition that standards of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment are not susceptible of Procrustean application
is carried forward when that Amendment's proscriptions are enforced against
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Findings of reasonable-
ness, of course, are respected only insofar as consistent with federal consti-
tutional guarantees. Id. at 33.
[This Court] will, where necessary to the determination of constitutional
rights, make an independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the
record so that it can determine for itself whether in the decision as to reason-
ableness the fundamental-i.e., constituitonal-criteria established by this
Court have been respected. Id. at 34.
See also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
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opportunity for the suspected felon to escape.3  However, the
common law is somewhat unclear in this area, and the fourth amend-
ment further confused the issue: it spoke of "search" and "seizure"
and "warrant," without referring specifically to arrests. Apparently
all of the cases involving arrest pursuant to a warrant that have
reached the Supreme Court have dealt with the requirement of
probable cause in the issuance of a warrant."' In the earliest case,
Ex parte Burford, the Court held a warrant of commitment illegal
where it failed to state some good cause and was not supported by
oath, both required by the Court to substantiate probable cause.39
In a recent leading case in this area, the defendant successfully
attacked the issuance of a warrant for his arrest on the basis that
the affidavit contained insufficient facts to constitute probable
cause." The affidavit contained no allegation that the affiant spoke
with personal knowledge of the matters contained in the complaint
nor did it indicate the sources of his belief. The Court, invalidat-
ing the arrest, claimed to reaffirm a similar ruling in another war-
rantless search case, Johnson v. United States,41 where the court
stressed the requirement for a magistrate's independent judgment
as to probable cause.42 It may be inferred from the Court's ap-
proach that it recognizes the principle of reasonableness operating
with that of probable cause to require that an independent magis-
trate make the determination of probable cause whenever practical.
A similar step in that direction has been made in a recent case
where the Court stated:
These contentions, if open to the Government here, would con-
front us with a grave constitutional question, namely, whether the
forceful nighttime entry into a dwelling to arrest a person reason-
ably believed within, upon probable cause that he had committed a
felony, under circumstances where no reason appears why an ar-
37 Leagre, "The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest," 54 J. Crim. L.,
C.&P.S. 393, 405 (1963). See Leigh v. Webb, 3 Esp. (Eng. N.P.) 166 (1800).
38 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927) ; Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927) ; West v. Cabell,
153 U.S. 78 (1894) ; Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
39 Ex parte Burford, supra note 38.
40 Giordenello v. United States, supra note 38; United States v. Greenberg, 320
F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1963); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F2d 342, 348
(10th Cir. 1963). See Note, 27 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 395 (1959), for the view that the
decision was based entirely upon Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and not upon the fourth amendment. Although this view was, and is,
plausible, later developments show a majority of the Court entertained another view.
Aigular v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
41 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
42 Id. at 13-15.
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rest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.43
Looking at the statements of the Court and the circumstances of
these cases, there appears to be a strong undercurrent of judicial
opinion that there is something more in the fourth amendment
than the mere requirement of showing probable cause to make an
arrest proper. This additional element may well be the inherent
right to privacy which may not be invaded without a magistrate
standing between the policeman and the individual, where the
privacy of the home is to be invaded to make the arrest.
Search Pursuant to a Warrant
Where a search is to be conducted pursuant to a search war-
rant, the fourth amendment apparently authorizes a search of
"persons, houses, papers, and effects" provided that the warrant
is validly issued upon a showing of probable cause to a magistrate
who makes an independent judgment. Actually, few cases contest-
ing a search pursuant to a warrant have reached the Supreme
Court. In Jones v. United States,44 a search warrant was issued
solely upon the basis of a police officer's hearsay affidavit reciting
personal observations of the officer's informant. The court held that
the warrant was issued on probable cause, but in so holding, the
Court looked beyond the issuance of the search warrant to the
officer's observations before the actual search, which corroborated
the informant's story. The court by its opinion in the Jones case
has diluted the probable cause element by stressing that "There is
a large difference between the two things to be proved (guilt and
probable cause) . . . and therefore a like difference in the quanta
and modes of proof required to establish them." 4
Other cases-for example, Marron v. United States 4 -- dealing
with search pursuant to a warrant have considered the requirement
of particular description and declared that searches in excess of
the scope of the warrant are unreasonable. The Court has stressed
the requirement that warrants particularly describe the items to be
seized as a protection against general searches. However, the Court
43 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958).
44 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The Court stated that even as to the question of
probable cause where no warrant exists, the officer may reasonably rely upon informa-
tion received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long
as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated.
45 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959), quoted in Jones v.
United States, supra note 44, at 270. See Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128
(1932), rejected by Draper.
46 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
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upheld the seizure in Marron on the ground that it was incident to
a lawful arrest, even though the search warrant in that case failed
to describe the items seized. The Court thus arrived at the
anomalous conclusion that, although the fourth amendment requires
specificity of description as a protection against general searches,
police in their discretion may make what are virtually general
searches for evidence incident to an arrest. Clearly a search warrant
which permits a general search is in violation of the reasonable-
ness clause. Marcus v. General Search Warrant 4 stands for the
proposition that searches conducted pursuant to a warrant which
gives police unlimited discretion are unlawful. A third case, Gouled
v. United States,49 stresses that the use of search warrants is limited
to those situations where the public or complainant has a primary
right under law to the goods sought. No right exists to search
and seize mere evidence either at common law or under the fourth
amendment °
From all these cases, it appears that the Court does recognize
the issuance of a search warrant as a protection of the right to
privacy; that the general search pursuant to a search warrant
violates this principle and is therefore unreasonable; and that there
is a need for probable cause to procure a search warrant.
Arrests Without A Warrant
The four leading cases present a confusing picture of the pres-
ent status of the law of warrantless arrests. While the first three
cases thoroughly confuse the issue of probable cause, the last case
tends to eliminate the principles of reasonableness and right to
privacy.
In two cases the Court seems to take opposite positions on
47 The Court asserted that under the fourth amendment prohibition of general
searches, a search warrant describing intoxicating liquor and articles used for its
manufacture does not authorize the seizure of a ledger and bills of account in a search
of the premises pursuant to the warrant. A significant point here is the fact that the
goods seized were a ledger showing large inventories of liquor, receipts and expenses,
including gifts to police officers, and other things relating to the business, all located
in a closet along with quantities of liquor. While the liquor in plain sight was seizable
per se, the contents of the ledger could not be determined until the officers had looked
through it to see if it had something to do with the crime. 275 U. S. 192 (1927)
(dictum). See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1948), for the right of federal
agents to seize contraband not even suspected to exist when the search was undertaken.
48 367 U.S. 717 (1961). The Court applied the fourth amendment through the
fourteenth amendment and implied that the warrant was too general in its description
of the items seized. Id. at 731-33.
49 225 U.S. 298 (1921). See Morrison v. United States, 262 F2d 449 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
UO Gouled v. United States, supra note 49, at 309; Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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similar sets of fact. In Draper v. United States,51 the Court held
that probable cause existed to arrest and search the defendant,
where federal narcotics officers relied solely upon the information
of a paid informant who accurately described the appearance and
itinerary of defendant and reported that he would have narcotics
on his person. The officers had corroborated the defendant's re-
ported appearance and location, but only corroborated the defend-
ant's commission of crime after arresting and searching him. How-
ever, the same Court, in Henry v. United States,52 decided that
federal agents lacked probable cause to stop and arrest the de-
fendants where the agents had been told by the employer of one
of the defendants that he was mixed up in interstate shipments,
and the officers, who were investigating the theft of an interstate
shipment of liquor, observed defendants twice loading cartons into
a car from a house in a residential area. The Court failed to dis-
tinguish the two cases, merely reiterating the rule that a warrantless
arrest for a felony can only be made where the offense is committed
in the officer's presence, or he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony.
The third case, Wong Sun v. United States,53 erodes further
the Draper case. Here, the Court held that no probable cause
existed for the arrest of defendant Toy who was arrested on the
basis of the testimony of an informant that he had purchased an
ounce of heroin the night before from one known to him only as
"Blackie Toy," proprietor of a laundry somewhere on a named
thirty-block street. The Court argued that probable cause must
be measured according to the facts of the particular case and that
the.., not infrequent abuse of the power to arrest cautions that
a relaxation of the fundamental requirements of probable cause
would 'leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers'
whim or caprice.' 54
In the fourth case, the confusion over the different aspects of
arrest, search and seizure split the Court and resulted in a four-
four stand-off affirming the arrest and search and seizure made in
a California case.55 There, on the day after a police officer's pur-
chase of marijuana from a known peddler, other police officers
51 358 U. S. 307 (1959).
52 361 U.S. 99 (1959).
53 371 U.S. 471 (1963). See Broeder, 'Wong Sun v. United States: A Study
in Faith and Hope," 42 Neb. L.Rev. 483 (1963).
54 Wong Sun v. United States, supra note 53, at 479; Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
55 Ker v. California, supra note 36.
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observed a meeting of the peddler and defendant husband under
identical circumstances, except that the officers saw nothing pass be-
tween the two. Without securing a warrant, the officers, with hear-
say information that defendant sold marijuana from his apartment,
obtained a passkey from the building manager and entered defend-
ant's apartment without warning, finding defendant husband seated
in the living room and defendant wife in the kitchen. One of the
officers identified himself, observed a package of marijuana on a scale
in the kitchen, arrested the defendants, and searched the apartment.
Four justices held that the search was validly made as incidental to
a lawful arrest founded upon probable cause, and asserted that
the officer's method of entry was not unreasonableY Four other jus-
tices found the unannounced intrusion into the defendant's apart-
ment in violation of the fourth amendment, relying upon the
principles of reasonableness and right to privacy.
However, as to the warrant requirement, the court has specifi-
cally held that, absent an allegation and showing of a lack of
probable cause, it makes no difference whether the officer made the
arrest with or without a warrant. 5 This is to be compared with the
indication of an opposite view by the Court in the Jones case, dis-
cussed earlier. Further, in Trupiano v. United States,"' it is stated
that the purpose of the arrest warrant is "to meet the dangers of
unlimited and unreasonable arrests of persons not at the moment
committing any crime." '9 There the Court held that the felony,
operating an illegal still, was being committed plainly in the presence
of the officers who were on the premises with the permission of the
owner, and the dangers against which the arrest warrant protects
were not present. While Jones and Trupiano appear to furnish valid
distinctions in relation to the need of an arrest warrant, the cases
previously discussed show that the Supreme Court has failed to
operate consistently on the basis of this attitude. Cases like Tru-
piano and Jones illustrate the Court's recognition of a protection
of the right to privacy in the arrest area, but other cases seem to
overlook this in treating more obvious problems.
Searches Without a Warrant
The leading case in the area of warrantless searches, Carroll v.
United States10 is also the leading case for the test of probable
GO Id. at 46. For cases contra on the "authority and purpose" requirement before
entering, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Wong Sun v. United
States, supra note 53. See also Broeder, supra note 53, at 503-07.
5 Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
58 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
G9 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
60 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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cause under the fourth amendment. The Carroll case states that
probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within
[the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reason-
ably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to war-
rant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense
has been or is being committed.61 In Carroll, search without a war-
rant and subsequent seizure of liquor from an automobile was at-
tacked as a violation of the fourth amendment. The seizure was
upheld by application of the above test.
As to this element of probable cause in warrantless searches,
the test for probable cause has recently been applied by the Su-
preme Court in Chapman v. United States,62 where the court, refer-
ring to Johnson v. United States,63 held that where the search of
a residence is involved a magistrate must stand between the officers
and the search. The Court treated within the framework of prob-
able cause a point more aptly placed under the principles of rea-
sonableness and right to privacy.
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those infer-
ences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence
sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the amendment to a
nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion
of police officers .... The right of officers to thrust themselves
into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual
but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security
and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided
by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforce-
ment agent.
There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the
need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy,
it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may
be dispensed with. But this is not such a case.64
While the quotation and the two cases clearly show a recog-
nition of principles of reasonableness and right to privacy in addi-
61 Id. at 162. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, (1949).
62 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
68 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
64 Chapman v. United States, .supra note 62, at 614-15, quoting Johnson v. United
States, supra note 41, at 13-15.
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tion to the principle of probable cause, as declared in the Carroll
case, it might be noticed that this language was applied to the
search of residences. Therefore, while the search of the home is well
protected from search without a warrant, there exist the questions
whether the Supreme Court considered the right of privacy to reach
beyond the home and whether the reasonableness of obtaining a
search warrant reaches to areas and things outside the home as
indicated by some cases in the past.""
Search Incident to an Arrest
An exception to the requirement that a search warrant issue
was formulated in Weeks v. United States.66 The Weeks case in-
volved a search incident to a valid arrest, which the Court declared
was "always recognized under English and American law." "This
exception was not mentioned in the fourth amendment, and the
Court in Weeks cites very weak authority for the proposition.,8
The original purpose of the doctrine is sound in providing for a
search of the arrestee and the area within his immediate control
for weapons or means of escape which he might secrete either upon
his person or close at hand for easy access if apprehended. The
exception, having begun as a dictum in the Weeks case, gradually
assumed more significance until, in Marron v. United States,"9 it
became a specific holding, elevated to the role of constitutional
doctrine.
@ See Gouled v. United States, supra note 49; Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921); Boyd v. United States, supra note 50; Sirimarco v. United States, 315
F2d 699 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963) ; "Although not literally
within the constitutional prohibition, we have long included in the notion that a
search and seizure of one's person, house, papers and effects, without the authority of
a search warrant, issued upon a showing of probable cause, was an unreasonable
search... ." Hart v. United States, 162 F.2d 74, 75, (10th Cir. 1947). But see Husty
v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
60 Weeks v. United States, supra note 50.
07 Id. at 392.
68 In 1 Bishop, Criminal Procedure §211, at 153 (1866), cited by the Court in
Weeks, the author states the rule thusly:
[Then] if he finds on the prisoner's person, or otherwise in his posses-
sion, either goods or moneys which he reasonably believes to be connected with
the supposed crime, as its fruits, or as the instruments with which it was
committed, or supplying proofs relating to the transaction, he may take and
hold them to be disposed of as the court directs.
Bishop cites no cases, but explains that the rule merely seems to flow from the
reason of the things. Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice § 60 (8th Ed. 1880),
also cited by the Court, limits the right to seize items from the person of the accused.
See Wharton, Criminal Pleading and Practice § 97 (10th Ed. 1918).
89 Marron v. United States, supra note 46.
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For the doctrine to apply, the search must take place at the
place of arrest and in close temporal proximity 70 and it will not
apply where premises are searched out of the presence of the
accused. There must be a valid arrest: the complaint upon which
the arrest warrant is based must charge an offense, if there is
an arrest warrant. However, it is not necessary in all cases to have
an arrest warrant in order to validate the arrest.71 Practicability
of obtaining a search warrant will not determine whether the search
will be upheld, assuming a valid arrest and a specific object of
search. The search need merely be reasonable." For the search to
be reasonable, it must not extend beyond the ill-defined area which
the Court finds in the particular case is within the control of the
accused.73
It seems that the exception has gone far beyond the original
purpose of protecting the arresting officer or preventing concealment
of means of escape, since searches need merely be "reasonable,"
and since the Court has made little effort to confine the doctrine
except in cases of the most flagrant violation of the rights of persons
accused of a crime. If the accused is arrested and is under the
control of the officers, is there at that point any rational basis for
allowing officers to search at their leisure without securing a war-
rant? It would appear that once the individual is in custody, the
necessity for further search without a warrant would cease. If they
have a basis for further search, they can easily secure a warrant.
If they have no basis for a warrant, they have no right to search. 4
70 Weeks v. United States, supra note 50; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925) ; Chapman v. United States, supra note 62.
71 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 462 (1932).
72 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). "The relevant test is not
whether it is reasonable to obtain a search warrant, but whether the search was
reasonable." Id. at 66. In other words, if the arrest is valid and the search is confined
to the area under the control of the accused and his person, the evidence so obtained
will be admissible in a criminal prosecution. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307 (1959).
73 The area of reasonableness has extended to an entire apartment in Harris v.
United States, supra note 47, and in Ker v. California, supra note 36. The Court, how-
ever, refused to extend it to a cabin in Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
In Harris and Ker, however, the officers were looking for specific items; in Krenen
they were merely looking. It extends to public and semi-public places. United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Draper v. United States, supra note 32. There are
several factors at work to determine reasonableness, and each will be discussed sepa-
rately in succeeding sections.
74 In two recent cases, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), and Stoner
v. California, supra note 36, the Supreme Court added further content to the doctrine
of reasonable search'incident to a valid arrest. In Preston, the Court indicated that its
present tendency is toward limiting the doctrine, holding a search of defendant's auto-
mobile to be unreasonable where it took place after his arrest and incarceration. In
Stoner, not remarkable on its facts, the Court held a search two days prior to arrest
in another state unreasonable. See Crawford v. B3annan, 336 F2d 505 (6th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 25
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
The Court seems to have lost sight of the original purposes of the
exception. In all but the most extreme circumstances, it indeed
"makes a mockery of the Fourth Amendment to sanction search
without a search warrant merely because of the legality of an
arrest." 75
The test of reasonableness allows something less than whole-
sale ransacking; something more than a search of the person of
the accused and of his immediate surroundings. If from all the
facts and circumstances it appears to the court to be reasonable,
the search will be upheld. There are several interests at stake-the
interest of the individual in preventing invasion of his privacy and
the loss of liberty which he may suffer as a result of the unwar-
ranted intrusion, the public interest in seeing that law enforcement
is effective and in seeing that justice is done. These are all vital
interests and the protection of each is well founded in history. In
the last analysis, however, which interests are given maximum
support will depend upon the value judgments of the Court. One
question which might be asked at this point is: where is the great-
est potential danger to our system of government?
III. REASONABLENESS: THE FEDERAL CONTENT
Standards of Reasonableness
The cases dealing with the reasonableness of a search incident
to a valid arrest indicate several prevalent factors which, singly
or in combination, may be determinative of the outcome. These
factors include the scope of the search in area covered and in terms
of the nature and number of items to be seized, the time when the
search occurs, the place to be searched, whether the arrest is merely
a pretext for search, immediate necessity to search, and consent of
the accused.
As well as searches for evidence of crime, search by administra-
tive officials, such as health inspectors, immigration authorities, and
welfare agents has become prevalent. Serious questions are raised
as to whether searches by these officers may be unreasonable, and
if so, under what circumstances.
What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula. The Constitution does not define what are reasonable
searches and regrettably in our discipline we have no ready litmus
paper test. The recurring questions of reasonableness of searches
must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case.76
75 United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 72, at 70 (dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter).
76 United States v.'Rabinowitz, supra note 72, at 63.
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It is thus necessary to examine some of the facts and circumstances
in which particular searches have been held reasonable or unreason-
able. It is well settled that the officer may search the person of one
who is arrested, or that part of the person/which might reasonably
be suspected of concealing weapons or fruits or instrumentalities of
crime. Moreover, search is permissible within an area large enough
to provide the officer with some measure of protection from con-
cealed weapons and to guard against destruction or disposal of
implements or fruits of crime or other contraband. The require-
ments as set up by the Supreme Court have been quite trouble-
some to the lower federal courts, particularly the requirement of
immediate control over the premises. Searches held reasonable by
lower federal courts range from a finding of a paper bag containing
narcotics on a stand next to the defendant,7 7 to a search of an entire
restaurant and motel, including drawers and wastebaskets for items
merely evidentiary in nature.7 8 It is not suggested here-indeed it
could not be-that all lower court decisions square with Supreme
Court holdings. It seems clear, however, that the officers will not
be limited to the one room in which the arrest takes place, so long
as the search is reasonable in physical scope, nature and number
of items taken, and is incident to the arrest.7 9
Area
If an officer is lawfully upon the premises and unexpectedly
finds an item, there would appear to be no bar to the use of that
item in evidence against the defendant.8 0 However, where the arrest
is for car theft, and defendant is lawfully arrested at his home, the
search of the house would be unreasonable, even though incident
to a valid arrest, because it is not reasonable to expect to find a
stolen automobile in a house. It would indicate that the officer was
merely searching for something of possible value in a subsequent
prosecution. This would be condemned as a general, exploratory
search which is precisely what the fourth amendment intended to
prohibit. Another illustration of unreasonableness could occur during
77 Carlo v. United States, 286 F2d 841 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
944 (1961).
78 United States v. Boyette, 299 F2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962). Another example of
the confusion is the contrast between United States v. Papani, 84 F2d 160 (9th Cir.
1936), in which a search of a barn 100 feet from the place of arrest was held reason-
able, and Dulek v. United States, 16 F2d 275 (6th Cir. 1926), in which a search of
a cabin 230 feet from the place of arrest was held unreasonable.
79 Ker v. California, supra note 36; Harris v. United States, supra note 47. In
Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962), officers arrested defendant
and took him to his office while they searched it. The court held that this was unrea-
sonable as too far removed from the place of arrest.
80 Robinson v. United States, 283 F2.d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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the search of a home for bootlegging equipment. While officers may
search closets or places where they might reasonably expect to find
the equipment, searches of desk drawers, jewelry boxes or the like
would not be permissible. It would be unreasonable to search these
latter places for items such as boilers, mash vats, and copper
coils. In the first illustration, the search of any part of the premises
is unreasonable. In the second illustration, a search of a part of the
premises would be reasonable, and a search of another part would
be unreasonable.
The nebulousness of the concept of reasonableness or the scope
of the search has not been conducive to the strict limitation of the
right to search incident to a valid arrest, as has been noted by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter.8' Mere reasonableness, without more, is not
especially helpful to a court, in view of the broadening scope and
the multitude of conflicting opinions on the content of reason-
ableness.
Nature and Number of Items Seized
Reasonable searches would seem to depend as much upon the
nature and number of items seized as upon the permissible area
which may be covered by the arresting officers. In most cases, the
nature and number of items have a bearing upon whether the
search is merely exploratory or whether the officers have a definite
objective in mind. Thus in Kremen v. United States,2 the Supreme
Court reversed a conviction based upon evidence gained in part
by ransacking an entire cabin and seizing a great number of
articles which were of little or no evidentiary value and did not
come within the class of items which may be searched for and
seized, i.e., fruits of the crime, instrumentalities of the crime, con-
traband or weapons.
Only these latter four classes of items are properly seizable,
even though other items may be found during the search . 3 Such
items would include untaxed whiskey, counterfeit money, burg-
lar tools, and things of like character. These items, if found during
a reasonable search, may be used in a subsequent prosecution, not-
withstanding that they are unrelated to the original purpose of the
search."
reUnited States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 72, at 79: "If upon arrest you may
search beyond the immediate person and the very restricted area that may fairly be
part of the person, what rational line can be drawn short of searching as many rooms
as arresting officers may deem appropriate."
82 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
83 Agnello v. United States, supra note 70.
84 Harris v. United States, supra note 47. In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1934), it is said:
The decisions of this court distinguish searches of one's house, office, papers
or effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime, from searches
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Congress, also, has recognized the basic distinction between
items harmless in themselves (having merely evidentiary value) and
those items directly connected with the commission of crime by
delineating in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the types
of items for which search may properly be made pursuant to a
warrant.8 5 Under the Federal Rules, warrants may not issue for
items of merely evidentiary value, and in light of the Supreme
Court's decisions, this is a fourth amendment standard, and not
merely a statutory requirement."8 The purpose of the "mere evi-
dence" rule is simply to restrict searches and to retain some sem-
blance of privacy. It is not suggested, however, that the "mere
evidence" rule is the sole solution to the problem of police control.
Another solution might allow searches for mere evidence, but only
upon warrant or upon independent probable cause. This, however,
is not likely to be a solution which the courts or the police would
advocate, since it involves more stringent requirements as to the
time, place, manner of search and specific description while allow-
ing the police a broader scope only as to the items for which search
can be made.
Under the present status of the law, the courts have difficulty
in determining what is merely evidentiary and what comes within
the permissible area of search. An interesting contrast might be
made in order to illustrate this uncertainty. In Marron v. United
States 17 the Supreme Court held that a ledger and utility bills
such as those made to find stolen goods for return to the owner, to take
property that has been forfeited to the Government, to discover property con-
cealed to avoid payment of duties for which it is liable, and from searches
such as those made for the seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars' tools,
gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in order to prevent the commission
of crime. Id at 465.
But see Regina v. McKay, 3 Crawf. & Dix, C.C. 205 (1844), an early Irish case
which holds that if officers may seize anything at all, they may seize only items rela-
tive to the offense charged.
85 Fed. R. Crim. P., Rule 41 (b) provides:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any
property:
(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States;
or
(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the
means of committing a criminal offense; or
(3) Possessed controlled or designed or intended for use or which is
or has been used in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 957." [Posses-
sion of property in and of a foreign government].
86 Gouled v. United States, supra note 49; Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); United States v. Lefkowitz, supra note 71; Kremen v. United
States, supra note 73.
87 Supra note 46. See also United States v. Boyette, supra note 78, which followed
Marron.
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found in a closet during a search for illicit liquor were instrumen-
talities of the crime of maintaining a nuisance. The items were
innocent in themselves, and had the officers not leafed through
them, they would not have known that the ledger and bills related
to carrying on an illicit business. An approach more restrictive in
terms of items to be searched for and seized appears in United
States v. Loft on Sixth Floor."' In suppressing allegedly obscene
materials, the court stated that the material "cannot be said to
be the means or instrumentality of depositing itself for an inter-
state shipment with any carrier," distinguishing between items used
as a means of committing a crime and items used merely to further
the criminal purposes of the individuals actually engaged in commit-
ting crime. The court held that the latter were merely evidentiary.
The requirement that an item come within the prescribed
classes in order to be subject to search and seizure is said to be an
irrationality in the criminal law which has utility only in that it
poses a restriction upon the power of officers to search and pro-
tects the individual's right to privacy. 9 However, it should be
pointed out here that it poses no restriction upon the officers to
search nor does it protect the privacy of the individual. It merely
restricts a later use of the items in a criminal prosecution after the
right to privacy has been invaded, and, as is pointed out by Kap-
lan, 0 privacy would be as well protected by restricting the search
to particular days of the month. Indeed, this would have the added
advantage of requiring no judicial interpretation!
Time of Search
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(c), states
in part:
The warrant shall direct that it be served in the day time, but
if the affidavits are positive that the property is on the person
or in the place to be searched, the warrant may direct that it be
served at any time.
This statement is indicative of a policy on the part of Congress
that searches conducted pursuant to warrants at night should re-
quire a greater standard of proof than searches conducted during
the day time. Thus, if the affidavits do not contain either state-
ments of personal knowledge of the affiant, or at the very least an
extremely reliable hearsay declaration, a nighttime search is viola-
88 182 F. Supp. 322, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
89 United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930).
90 Kaplan, "Search and Seizure-A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law," 49
Calif. L. Rev. 474, 479 (1961).
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tive of statute.9 The requirement of positive evidence to validate
a nighttime search would not appear to be a fourth amendment
standard insofar as it is based upon the warrants clause, because
constitutionally only probable cause is required.92 However, in light
of the more inconvenient nature of the nighttime search, and the
experience of the framers of the Constitution, one might well be led
to believe that there is a constitutional basis for the differentiation
based upon the reasonableness of the search.
Arguably, it is unreasonable to conduct a search at night with-
out having an extremely reliable basis for believing that the items
for which search is to be made are upon the premises except in cases
of absolute necessity; for example, a search for a bomb.93 Indeed,
there is a substantial basis for requiring a warrant to search at
night, for until the warrant has been issued by a magistrate, no
judicial barrier has been set up to protect individual liberties.
The control factor has been limitation of the search itself rather
than the limitation of the right to search, that is, the courts have
not discussed the requirement of independent probable cause or
positive cause to search incident to an arrest at any time, assuming
rather that probable cause is not required.95
91 United States v. Fitzmaurice, 45 F.2d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1930) ; United States
v. Kaplan, 286 Fed. 963 (D. Ga. 1923). The court in United States v. Tolomeo,
52 F. Supp. 737, 738 (W.D. Pa. 1943), required as positive evidence only a statement
that the items to be searched for are upon the premises, taking the view that some-
thing less than personal knowledge is required.
92 The fourth amendment provides in part: "and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause . . .". This could be interpreted as including both nighttime
and daytime searches. It would be extremely difficult to comprehend a concept of
probable cause which gave the same words different meanings at different times,
vague as the words are to begin with.
93 Brinegar v. United States, supra note 54, at 180. See the dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Jackson, advocating an exception to fourth amendment requirements on the
basis of the social harm done, e.g., enforcing the fourth amendment more strictly in
favor of a bootlegger than in favor of a kidnapper.
94 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948) ; Distefano v. United States, 58 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1932). But see Ker
v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), in which the officers had no warrant of any kind. The
Court discussed only probable cause, and the facts of that case show no positive proof
on the part of the officers that narcotics would be found. Indeed, at the time the
officers broke into Ker's apartment, they had only suspicion.
95 In Ker v. California, supra note 94, Rabinowitz v. United States, supra note 72,
and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1948), the arresting officers would have
been able to secure a warrant to search, for arguably there was independent probable
cause to search. However, in none of these cases was the question discussed. In
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), the Court again does not discuss the
question of independent probable cause, but it does not seem that the officers would
have been able to include the ledgers and bills in the search warrant since they were
unknown at the time the warrant was secured. However, the Court there upheld the
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Where the search is incident to a valid arrest, the time at which
the search is made should not, in and of itself, be a limiting factor.
The valid arrest underlies the search and validates it insofar as it
is reasonable as to scope. Once the valid arrest has been made, the
wheels of the criminal process are set in motion. The individual is
lawfully in custody and the officers at that time have a right and
a duty to search the person of the accused and the area within his
immediate control, even though they do not have probable cause
to believe that they will find any specific items. The stringent re-
quirements of a nighttime search were formulated so that there
could be no unwarranted invasion of individual privacy. If the
rights of the individual have been respected to a degree consistent
with the duties of the law enforcement officers, an otherwise rea-
sonable search should be allowed, regardless of the time at which
it takes place. 8
Place of Searck
The fourth amendment affirms the right of the people "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. . . ." This language might be inter-
preted strictly to mean that only persons and houses are entitled
to be free of unreasonable searches for papers and effects. However,
such an interpretation would not be consistent with the liberality
with which such protective provisions should be construed and it
has not been adopted.
An individual thus has a right to be free from unreasonable
searches in his home or other living quarters, 7 his office 98 or other
place of business,99 his apartment or hotel room,100 and all buildings
within the curtilage.'0 1 However, buildings outside the curtilage,10 2
or fields or grounds 103 have been held not to be within the constitu-
tional protection. In any case, it would extend to the person, wher-
ever he might be, and would extend to his papers and effects within
the protected areas. The courts have placed more emphasis upon
the "persons" and "houses" mentioned in the fourth amendment
search as incident to a valid arrest without discussing the requirement of independent
probable cause.
96 Go-Bart Co. v. United States, supra note 86.
97 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
98 United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 72; Go-Bart Co. v. United States,
supra note 86; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
99 Warren v. Territory of Hawaii, 119 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941).
100 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
101 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) ; Walker v. United States, 225
F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1955).
102 Brock v. United States, 256 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1958).
103 United States v. Sims, 202 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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than they have placed upon the "papers and effects" of the indi-
vidual in allowing unreasonable or trespassory searches in unpro-
tected areas. 04 Therefore, whether a search is within or without
the protected area may determine the use which may be made of
the evidence, rather than the reasonableness of the search. In this
sense, the place of search is crucial to a prosecution, but is not
crucial in terms of the reasonableness requirement. 05 This would
not appear to be consistent with recent cases of the Supreme Court
which profess to do away with the outmoded concepts of property
law as a basis for protection of constitutional rights. 06 If actual
invasion of the constitutional rights of an individual may thus be
permitted by such a restrictive interpretation, simply because a
search occurs upon one part of an individual's property and not
another, then the fourth amendment is merely partially protective
of rights affirmed by that amendment. An impermissible, unreason-
able search is unreasonable wherever it occurs, and the question
whether an individual will be deprived of his liberty should not
depend upon a fortuity.
Arrest As a Pretext for Search
A basic requirement of a reasonable search without warrant is
an arrest to which the search is merely incident. If the arrest is a
sham to cover up the real purpose of the officers, i.e., making the
search, the search will be unreasonable, even if the arrest be valid. 0 7
Thus an arrest for a minor traffic violation cannot be the basis of a
search of the person for narcotics, if the primary purpose of the
officers was to discover evidence of narcotics. 08 The intent of the
officers is most important in this type of case. However, merely
because items seized in a search incident to arrest are unrelated to
the offense for which the individual was arrested it does not follow
that the arrest was merely a pretext for search.109 If the arrest is not
a pretext and the individual is properly in custody the search is
permissible regardless of purpose. 10 Charles v. United States"' is
an interesting illustration of this point. There, local officers arrested
104 Hester v. United States, supra note 101.
105 United States v. Young, 322 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1963).
106 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); See Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961) (wiretap case), which was not based upon local rules of trespass,
but upon "the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area."
Id. at 512.
107 United States v. Lefkowitz, 255 U.S. 452, 462 (1932) ; Taglavore v. United
States, 291 F2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961).
108 Taglavore v. United States, supra note 107.
109 Collins v. United States, 289 F2d 129 (5th Cir. 1960).
110 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
111 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1960).
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defendant for assault and battery. After they had frisked him for
weapons, they learned that he was a narcotics peddler. The officers
then searched further, this time with the express purpose of finding
narcotics, although he had not been arrested for this offense.11 2 The
court refused to look to the purpose of the second search, because
the arrest had been made prior to the officers' knowledge of the
narcotics, and was therefore not a pretext to search for it.
Once there has been a valid arrest for a proper purpose, the
right to further privacy has been severely limited, but if the officers
invaded the privacy of the individual unjustifiedly, a subsequent
search cannot be justified.113 However, a thorough search for proper
purposes ought not be unduly restricted where the individual is
properly in custody.
In cases where the arrest is a pretext for the search for items
unrelated to the offense giving rise to the arrest, the law enforcement
officers are faced with a novel situation in which the arrest though
valid and the search within reasonable bounds will still be held un-
reasonable because the arresting officers did not go to the premises
in the proper, unknowing state of mind. It is in fact difficult in some
cases to tell whether the officers went to arrest or to search. In most
cases, they intend to do both. It is a fine line which the courts have
drawn in assessing whether the arrest is a pretext for the search.
The doctrine ought to be limited to clear cases in which the offense
for which the individual is arrested is a minor one for which neither
an arrest nor a search is usually made, and the items searched for
are clearly unrelated to the offense upon which the arrest is based.
It has not, however, been so limited. In United States v. Harris,"4
the arrest was valid, the search was reasonable, and the items to be
searched for related directly to the offense for which the arrest was
made. The court held that the arrest was merely a pretext for the
search, because the officers knew of the items previous to the arrest.
A problem closely related to the arrest as a pretext for search
arises when officers contrive to arrest in a particular place where the
officers strongly suspect that evidence may be found. Such tactics
have been condemned and resulting searches held unreasonable,
because, again, the search and not the arrest is uppermost in the
minds of the arresting officers. 15
112 1d. at 388.
113 Taglavore v. United States, supra note 107, Baskerville v. United States,
227 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1955). And see Abel v. United States, supra note 110, as an
example of the result reached where the protections of the fourth amendment are not
extended by the courts.
114 321 F2d 739 (6th Cir. 1963).
115 McKnight v. United States, 183 F2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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Consent
If an individual in fact consents to a search, or if he invites the
search, it cannot be said to be an unreasonable imposition upon him.
However, consent will not be implied, and all doubts will be resolved
against the officer."' Consent which is coerced is no consent, and an
officer who demands or even one who asks admittance under color
of his office cannot be said to have gained consent." 7 Consent must
be freely and intelligently given, and in view of the presumption
against waiver of constitutional rights, there must be clear and
positive proof of consent." 8
The courts have thus adopted a very strict standard with re-
spect to consent, and have excluded evidence where there is an
unreasonable search and lack of consent to it. The basic question
raised is what facts will establish consent or the lack of it. In all
probability, consent given after arrest and incarceration will not be
considered as having been given freely, regardless of the lack of
external force and apparent lack of equivocation" 9 because of the
show of force and the superior authority which the police are able
to put forth.120 Thus words such as, "You can go out and search the
place; it's clean," said after questioning in jail have been held to be
non-consensual.12 1 Courts are inclined to characterize such searches
as mere submissions to authority. Evidence of such submission has
been constructed from a mere showing of the police officer's badge,"z
and it is of no consequence that the accused did not attempt to stop
the search since such an attempt would undoubtedly have proved
futile.' 2 However, merely invoking authority which the officer does
116 Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
117 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
11s Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.
1963) ; Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960). But see Robinson v.
United States, 325 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1964).
119 Channel v. United States, supra note 118.
120 Canida v. United States, 250 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1958).
121 In Judd v. United States, supra note 116, at 651, the Court stated:
Conceivably, that is the calm statement of an innocent man; conceivably,
again, it is but the false bravado of a small-time criminal. But, however it be
characterized it hardly establishes willing agreement that the officers search
the household without securing a -warrant. Comparable statements have been
held insufficient where the victim of the search was safely in his home.
122 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313 (1921).
123 United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951). In Lerner, the
words used by officers were "you just sit quietly and you won't get hurt."
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in fact possess will not invalidate the consent if it is freely given.124
The case is not so clear, however, if the officer does not actually
possess the authority, for example, if he could not get a warrant.
In such a case there may be something analogous to a fraudulent
inducement to consent, since the individual may well be motivated
to consent by the apparent futility of refusing.
The "false bravado" test propounded by the court in Judd v.
United States 125 indicates that coercion might be found in any case
in which the individual had anything to hide, unless the consent to
search amounts to a confession. However, if the accused confesses
and leads the officers to the items for which the search would be
made, there is no reason not to accept this as consent. 126
But if the courts were willing to require a full and fair dis-
closure by the officers to the individual as to the information which
they possess, there would be no need to discuss the consent or lack
thereof in terms of "false bravado." The individual would then be
in possession of knowledge enabling him to consent or refuse consent
on the basis of all the facts. If consent is given without full dis-
closure by the officers, then it should be clear that in legal con-
templation, there has been no consent.
Consent may not be gained through a subterfuge. Thus, if the
individual does not know that his visitors are police officers, or if
they gain entrance through stealth, or as social or business callers,
he cannot be held to have consented to a search by them.127 If,
however, knowing that they are police officers he invites them in,
and while there, they observe contraband or other items which
might properly be searched for, a conviction on the basis of evi-
dence obtained at that time is proper.12
Generally, consent to search may not be given by another, such
as one's employer,129 or his agent,130 or the owner of the property
which he rents.13' However, where two persons have equal rights to
the use and occupancy of the premises, either may consent to a
124 Cofer v. United States, 37 F2d 677 (1930) (officer stated that he would return
with a search warrant).
125 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
126 United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944) ; Whitley v. United States, 237
F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ;
Windsor v. United States, 286 Fed. 51 (6th Cir. 1923) ; McClintick v. United States,
283 Fed. 781 (8th Cir. 1922).
127 Gatewood v. United States, 209 F2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
128 Reed v. Rhay, 323 F2d 498 (9th Cir. 1963).
129 United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
130 Cofer v. United States, supra note 124.
131 Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).
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search over the other's objection.132 This would include partners,1 ' 3
husband and wife184 or co-tenants. 35
Personal Observation by the Officer
A police officer should not be required to ignore evidence of
crime which he can observe personally, because observation without
more is not an unreasonable search. 1 6 What takes place in a case of
personal observation by the officer is not in fact a search, with the
poking and prying which that word connotes, but is something less
than a search. For an item to be observable, it must be patently
obvious or in plain sight. 3 7 In such a case, the officers ought not be
required to close their eyes and walk away merely because they saw
items for which they did not have a search warrant.
Courts have been critical of the officer who presses into a resi-
dence to search for unknown items, but where the items are of an
incriminating nature, and are in plain sight of the officer, 38 it is
permissible to say that there is no danger of a ransack search to
find unknown items. Personal observation has built-in limitations
which tend to keep it reasonable.
If there has been a considerable period of observation by police
officers, as opposed to the situation involving mere chance obser-
vation, a warrant ought to be required because of the lack of im-
mediate necessity. 39 If the officers are invited into the home, or go
132 United States v. Goodman, 190 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1961).
'33 United States v. Sferas, 210 F2d 69 (1959), cert. denied, Skally v. United
States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954).
134 Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948).
135 United States v. Goodman, supra note 132.
136 Reed v. Rhay, supra note 128; Ellison v. United States, 206 F2d 476 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
137 Davis v. United States, 327 F2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964).
139 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United States v. Horton, 328
F2d 139 (3d Cir. 1964).
139 Jones v. United States, 327 U.S. 493 (1958). It is somewhat questionable
whether there need be immediate necessity to vindicate the officers' right to search on
the basis of personal observation if the search is made incident to a valid arrest. In
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court held that it would look
merely to the reasonableness of the search, specifically overruling Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), on this particular point. However, in Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), the Court indicated that it would again require prac-
ticability, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent. In Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Court mentioned the doctrine of immediate necessity to search
which has special relevance in narcotics cases, and in cases involving search of ve-
hicles, due to their mobility, but the Court has not indicated that it will require the
immediate necessity or emergency situation to validate an otherwise reasonable search.
The doctrine of immediate necessity, if it is to be applied, would severely limit
the search incident to arrest, for necessity exists only when the object to be searched
for will shortly be removed or has unusual propensity for speedy destruction or dis-
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there for purposes of official visitation, a mere observation and
seizure of items will not be violative of an individual's right to
privacy.140 However, if the officers go merely as a pretext to observe,
then the same result would follow as if there were an arrest as a
pretext for search.'
An observation which involves a trespass upon defendant's
property is not unreasonable merely upon that account. The officer
must be illegally within the curtilage before the observation becomes
unreasonable.142 Thus, if the curtilage is to be invaded for purposes
of observation, it would be wise for the officers to obtain a warrant
in advance of the invasion, so as to validate their entry upon the
premises. 43 Especially in cases which involve prolonged periods of
observation, this requirement for a warrant imposes only the slight-
est handicap upon the police.
Administrative Searches and the Need for Reasonableness
The basic difference between administrative searches and
searches by police officers is that there are neither criminal process
nor criminal sanctions directly connected with the administrative
search. 44 The fourth amendment makes no distinction as to the type
of search which it prohibits, other than the distinction predicated
posal, and where there is probable cause to search. Mere expediency is not enough
if there is no danger of losing the items sought. See McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
140 Reed v. Rhay, sgpra note 128; Davis v. United States, supra note 137;
United States v. Horton, supra note 138.
141 United States v. Evans, 194 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1961).
142 Hester v. United States, supra note 101; United States v. Benson, 299 F.2d
45 (6th Cir. 1962).
143 Evidence obtained by means of wiretap is a form of non-visual personal
observation and is not within the scope of the instant discussion. Wiretap evidence is
not unreasonable under fourth amendment standards. However, it is prohibited by 48
Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958), and the Supreme Court has engrafted an
exclusionary rule in the federal courts. In the future, however, this exclusionary rule,
as in Mapp, may be applied to the states on the basis that the states, by allowing the
use of illegally obtained evidence have violated defendant's right to privacy, and have
affirmatively allowed police illegality. In other words, use of evidence gained in viola-
tion of a federal statute may be held to be unreasonable under a fourth amendment
standard or a violation of due process of law under a fourteenth amendment standard.
Other methods of electronic eavesdropping are not prohibited and thus the courts
must deal directly with the concept of reasonableness. The Supreme Court has recently
held, in Silverman v. United States, supra note 106, that driving a spike microphone
into a party wall is an "intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," and hence
is not reasonable. This is an indication by the Court of a refusal to be swayed further
by technical concepts of property law in assessing constitutional rights. Compare
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
144 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960) ; Abel v. United States,
supra note 110; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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upon the reasonableness of the search. This would indicate that
searches which are unreasonable, whether they are administrative or
criminal, violate the fourth amendment. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has made the distinction, and has excepted administrative
searches from the requirements of the fourth amendment.
In Frank v. Maryland,45 the Court said that one administra-
tive search "touch[ed] at most upon the periphery of the important
interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection
against official intrusion." 146 "Here was no midnight knock at the
door, but an orderly visit in the middle of the afternoon with
no suggestion that the hour was inconvenient." 147 The four dis-
senters in Frank, however, stated that no government official should
be allowed to invade the home without having taken the proper
procedural safeguards against infringement of individual liberty. 4
The Frank case goes even further than the cases which examine
search incident to a valid arrest, for there was no arrest there. In
administrative matters the need to search is not as pressing as it is
in the average criminal case, since the matters in question-health
problems, welfare checks-do not usually involve immediate danger
to life and limb, or the possibility of destruction of evidence, the
main bases for allowing search without warrant incident to a valid
arrest.
Abel v. United States' 49 involved an administrative arrest by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service for purposes of deporta-
tion. Pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant, the Service
arrested defendant and proceeded to make an extensive search of
his belongings. The information was then turned over to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for purposes of criminal prosecution. There
was evidence tending to show that the FBI had planned the entire
operation and that FBI officers had been present during the ad-
ministrative arrest and search, and that the whole operation had
been planned so that the FBI could use the information gained
145 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
146 Frank v. Maryland, .rtpra at 367. Frank preceded Mapp v. Ohio in point of
time. At the time of the decision in Frank, Wolf v. Colorado was still in effect. The
writers have, however, no reason to believe that the result in Frank would be changed
by the Mapp decision. In Wolf, the Court recognized as fundamental the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, merely stating that the exclusionary
rule was not a requirement of the fourth amendment. In Frank, the Court recognizes
a different quality of right in relation to an administrative search than exists under
either Wolf or Mapp.
147 359 U.S. at 366.
148 359 U.S. at 374. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), reaffirmed
Frank without opinion.
149 Supra note 110.
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during the search. In other cases, the courts have held that such an
operation is an arrest incident to the search, because of the primary
purpose of the arrest'" The Supreme Court in Abel, however, re-
fused to look beyond the reasonable scope of the search at the exact
time of the arrest. A more reasonable approach would be to provide,
in a subsequent criminal prosecution, some measure of protection by
looking to the original search to see if it was reasonable and incident
to proper formal proceedings entitling administrative officers to in-
vade an individual's privacy, or look, hypothetically, to see if the
evidence would have been properly procured had the police officers
found it originally.
In a true administrative search, there is no intent to bring
criminal proceedings against the individual. There is merely an intent
to rectify a possible injury to the public health or some similar in-
terest of the community. However, the possibility of finding evi-
dence of an incriminating nature and therefore the possibility of a
subsequent prosecution is still present. Furthermore, there is a basic
inconsistency in allowing government in one of its aspects to search
without formal proceedings and even without probable cause, as an
incident to protection of health, welfare, and morals, and forbidding
government in another form to search unless certain procedural
safeguards are met. It is clear that the fourth amendment and the
fourteenth amendment make no differentiation on the basis of the
interests to be protected as the Supreme Court has done by de-
claring that certain types of searches need not be reasonable. The
policies embodied in the fourth amendment have been determined,
and in reason they apply with equal vigor to administrative
searches.
Indeed, an administrative search, while it may not bring about
a criminal prosecution, may give rise to civil sanctions, for example,
fine, imprisonment for contempt, or deportation. In such cases the
pressing need to prevent unreasonable invasions of privacy is quite
clear. However, the rationale is ultimately predicated upon the
possibility or severity of sanctions but upon the individual's right
to be free from trespasses by the state.151 Judge Prettyman has
stated the view succinctly:
The basic premise of the prohibition against searches was not
protection against self-incrimination; it was the common-law right
of a man to privacy in his home, a right which is one of the indis-
pensable ultimate essentials of our concept of civilization.... It
was not related to crime or to suspicion of crime.... To say that
a man suspected of crime has a right to protection against search
150 See notes 107 through 115, supra.
151 See Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 (C.P. 1765).
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of his home ... but that a man not suspected of crime has no such
protection is a fantastic absurdity.152
Thus, regardless of whether the search is to enforce the health laws,
to search for evidence of crime, or to determine an applicant's eligi-
bility for welfare, the invasion of privacy is the same, whether the
loss be life, liberty, or property.153
Certainly, we are involved in a balancing process where the
right of the individual to privacy must be weighed against the need
of society for efficient law enforcement. But the right of privacy
should be maintained until a necessary exception is shown.154 The
determining factor in each case must be, as in the search of a mov-
ing vehicle or a search incident to an arrest, reasonable grounds
that the accused will disappear or that evidence will be destroyed
before a warrant can be procured and executed. In this manner the
fourth amendment requirement of a warrant issued by an inde-
dependent magistrate for a reasonable search or seizure is the rule,
and the sole exceptions are those based upon necessity.
Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
suppression of evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and
seizures. 55 However, only a person aggrieved may object. Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States'56 the con-
cept of a person aggrieved was strictly limited by the ancient laws
of property. It was required that the individual raising the question
of unreasonable search and seizure claim ownership in the property
seized or the premises searched. The problem which this presented
was recognized by Judge Learned Hand in Connolly v. Medalie.57
152 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 339
U.s. 1 (1950).
153 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See also Reich, "Midnight
Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act," 72 Yale L.J. 1347 (1963).
'54 See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 68 (1950).
'55 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e) states:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
district court for the district in which the property was seized for the return
of the property and to suppress for the use as evidence anything so obtained
on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized without warrant...
The motion [to suppress evidence] shall be made before trial or hearing
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of
the grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the
motion at the trial or hearing.
IN5 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
157 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Individuals could come to court as victims of unreasonable searches
or as non-owners of the property, but they could not adopt the two
inconsistent positions. Thus, the individual was required to elect
which horn of the dilemma would pinion him.158
An individual now has standing to object to evidence obtained
by an unreasonable search and seizure even though he claims that
the property is not his and that it was not found upon premises
owned by him where he is charged with possession.' 59 The rationale
behind such a holding is clear. If a defendant were required to claim
that property belonged to him in order to secure the benefit of the
exclusionary rule, it would be tantamount to a confession, in effect
coerced, to a charged possession offense. Even if the search were
ultimately found to be unreasonable, he might still be convicted
upon the basis of the confession that he had contraband in his
possession. If a defendant did not claim that the property was his,
it could be used in evidence against him, over his objection.160
At present, if the individual, even on the premises of another, is
in such proximity to an article as to be able to exercise immediate
control over it, even though he does not claim that the article is his,
he has standing to object to its introduction into evidence.' More
than one person may have standing to object to the use of a single
item or the search of a single premises, for example, an owner and
16213a lessee, joint owners or joint tenants, or a bailor and bailee, 8 or
even a licensee or invitee on the premises.6 An author of a letter
and the recipient may both have standing to object to the use of
the letter in evidence, even though under traditional property con-
cepts, the author would have no more interest in it.165 Similarly, a
husband and wife may both object to the use of money taken from
the wife's purse, if the husband can prove that he gave it to her.'66
It is still the rule, however, that the individual must show some
158 Id. at 630.
159 Jones v. United States, supra note 156.
160 Baskerville v. United States, supra note 113; United States v. Blok, supra
note 129; Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1947). One court even
went so far as to hold that a lessee could not object to evidence where he did not
claim to occupy the premises. Curry v. United States, 192 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1952).161 Carlo v. United States, 286 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
744 (1961).
162 United States v. Elliot Hall Farm, 42 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.J. 1941).
168 United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962).
164 United States v. Blitz, 199 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
165 Harlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
814 (1963).
1'6 See Ramirez v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
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invasion of his privacy, even though he has no ownership interest in
the property. 167 Thus, an individual has no standing to object to
evidence used against another, 6" nor may he object to the use of
evidence against him even though it was illegally obtained from
another.'69
Property which has been abandoned can no longer be con-
sidered to belong to the accused and will be admitted over his
objection. However, for purposes of standing, it is difficult to aban-
don an item. The standard appears to require a complete loss of
possession and control. Thus even throwing an item into the trash
is not considered abandonment for purposes of standing to object
to that itemY.70
One problem which does not seem to have arisen as yet is the
"cross use" of evidence obtained through unreasonable search and
seizure. In such a case, officers could search unreasonably the prem-
ises of two or more individuals who are partners in crime or members
of a conspiracy. The prosecution under the present status of the
law could be permitted to use the evidence so obtained in each
search against members of the conspiracy whose privacy was not
invaded by that particular search, even if another unreasonable
search had been made of that person's premises. The net result
would be several illegal searches and seizures, and as many success-
ful prosecutions. This would be true simply because of each person's
lack of standing to challenge the particular evidence used against
him. It is hoped that the courts would realize that this too makes a
mockery of the fourth amendment, and that they would apply a
"totality concept"; in other words, view the transaction as a whole.
In light of the Supreme Court's rejection of artiflical property dis-
tinctions in Jones v. United States,'71 which held that a defendant
has standing to object to evidence if he is charged with possessing it,
the way is clear for such a holding in a proper case. 7 2 The reason
167 Hair v. United States, 289 F2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
168 Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, O'Kelly
v. United States, 326 U.S. 724 (1945).
169 Lagow v. United States, 159 F2d 245 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
858 (1947). See Henzel v. United States, 296 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1961).
170 Work v. United States, 243 F2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1957). However, the result
would be different if the trash were subsequently collected. See United States v.
Minker, 312 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
171 Jones v. United States, supra note 156.
172 California, since adopting the exclusionary rule, has so held in People v.
Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 759, 290 P2d 855, 857 (1955), on the basis that the evidence
itself is tainted because illegally obtained and is inadmissible because it is a violation
of the defendant's constitutional rights to use it, not because it was obtained in viola-
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that courts have emphasized standing in the past is that the funda-
mental concern has been with the right to privacy. However, if the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to balance the equities and return
matters to the status quo prior to the illegal police action, then
standing should not be a problem in any case in which illegally ob-
tained evidence it attempted to be used against a defendant.
Reasonableness: A Summary
The concept of reasonableness is a construct which the Supreme
Court uses in determining whether or not evidence gained by a
search will be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution. The
question is one of characterization of the content of reasonableness
to see what might be considered reasonable in a particular case.
The interpretation which has been put upon the fourth amend-
ment's reasonableness clause is that searches may be reasonable
without a search warrant if made incident to a valid arrest. A search
made incident to an arrest is not entirely protected by the fourth
amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. If a search ac-
tually is incident to an arrest, it is prima facie reasonable, and will
be declared unreasonable only if it is found that it exceeds the
bounds previously outlined. 73
The incident-to-a-valid-arrest test does not seem to be the
soundest criterion of reasonableness, in order to legalize a search,
because there may be no rational connection between the arrest and
the search. If the individual is arrested a block from his home, no
search could be made of the home merely because he was arrested.
The fact that he is in his home at the time of the arrest is merely
fortuitous, and should not give the officers license to roam at will.
Under the incident-to-a-valid-arrest test, the defendant's papers
and house are more protected by the Constitution while he is
away than while he is there, an anomalous situation of small comfort
to an accused. 74
In certain emergency cases, it is undesirable to obtain a war-
tion of defendant's constitutional rights. Previous emphasis has been upon an in-
dividual's right to privacy, but the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not merely to
protect the right to privacy. Its purpose is to prevent benefit from illegal police
practices altogether.
173 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950). Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting, states that the historical context of the fourth amendment shows that
searches without warrants and searches with warrants unrestricted in scope were
deemed unreasonable, barring only exceptions justified by "absolute necessity." Under
the historical theory, a warrant would be required to make the search reasonable in
all but a very few cases.
174 See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926).
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rant, either to arrest or to search, for example, where a felony is
committed in the presence of the officer or where the officer has
probable cause to believe that a felony has just been committed
and that the accused committed it. A search of the person in either
of the above examples would certainly come within the original
purpose of the doctrine of search incident to arrest. Indeed, an
officer might well be considered lax in his duties if he failed to search
the person suspected. In all other situations, reasonableness should
be based not upon the tenuous doctrine of search incident to arrest,
but upon whether there is cause to invade the privacy of the indi-
vidual at this particular time1r 5 By requiring only a reasonable
search, regardless of need, to invade the privacy, the warrants clause
of the fourth amendment is seriously weakened, and greater impetus
is given to law enforcement officials to disregard the inconvenient
and limiting procedure of securing a warrant. In one respect, it
might well be to the advantage of the officers to secure a warrant
however. While under a search warrant, officers are limited to a
search for specific items, they may use a valid arrest to validate a
finding of articles which might not have been specified in a search
warrant. Under a search incident to a valid arrest, the officers will
usually be more strictly limited in the area which they can cover.
Under a search warrant, as long as they are looking for the specified
items, and have not merely started rummaging, they may cover a
much broader area. Indeed, under a warrant, officers may search the
entire premises. If they should unexpectedly come upon an item
which is incriminating and is of such a nature that it would properly
have been the subject of a search, it may be justified as incident to
the arrest.
It is apparent that a balance must be maintained between con-
flicting interests of society that would promote security within one's
home and at the same time maximize the freedom of law enforce-
ment officers to protect the peace and order of the community.
Criminal searches do invade privacy and often involve substantial
175 See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). This case was subse-
quently overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz, 337 U.S. 56 (1950), on this par-
ticular point. The Court does not appear disposed to reconsider the problem, for in
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Court upheld a nighttime arrest and
search of an apartment and an automobile as incident to a valid arrest, even though
on the facts there appears to have been ample time to secure a search warrant, and
it is very probable that the officers could have described particularly the items to be
searched for. Rather, the Court appears to be extending the doctrine of search incident
to arrest by allowing a nighttime arrest upon probable cause to validate a night-time
search going beyond even present limits, extending not only to an apartment but to an
automobile parked some distance from the apartment.
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damage to reputation. Thus the fourth amendment imposes upon
law enforcement officers the standard of probable cause. 78 It is
the strict enforcement of this standard that balances these conflct-
ing interests of society and prevent police intrusions such as found in
Entick v. Carrington.77
In the United States, civilized standards of search and seizure
are the rule rather than the exception. In Rochin v. California'78
police officers transgressed the bounds of decent law enforcement,
violating defendant's person in a shocking manner. The needs of
society are not well served by the use of brutal methods. The same
principle, while not so strikingly brought to one's attention, is in-
volved in all search and seizure cases. In fact, where shocking
methods are absent, the harm done to one's privacy may be just as
great.
An arrest at the minimum requires probable cause, with or
without a warrant, whereas a search at the minimum need only be
reasonable under the circumstancesY.79 The standard for arrests with
warrants and without warrants is not the same. Otherwise the offic-
ers would have no incentive to procure arrest warrants. 80 Thus, the
Court has made a distinction between arrests and searches. This is
unwarranted under the fourth amendment, which makes no distinc-
tion between the two.
Any impediments to law enforcement brought about by the
enforcement of constitutional rights is a small price to pay for the
safeguarding of liberty. The framers of the Constitution made the
policy decision as to which interest deserved the greater protection
long ago: "To break and enter . . . to destroy all the rights to
privacy in an effort to uproot crime may suit the purposes of des-
potic power, but those methods cannot abide the pure atmosphere
of a free society." 181 This, then, is the primary reason for requiring
warrants in all but the most pressing circumstances, and why the
search without warrant incident to arrest should be limited to its
original purposes, which were born of necessity rather than con-
venience. The present law of search and seizure purports to be a rule
176 See Comment, "Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the
Fourth Amendment," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 664 (1961).
177 Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 (C.P. 1765).
178 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
179 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
180 Ibid. See also Barrett, "Police Practice and the Law-From Arrest to Release
or Charge," 50 Calif. L. Rev. 11, 20 (1962) ; Note, "Philadelphia Police Practices and
the Law of Arrest," 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1182 (1952).
181 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 192 (1948) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Murphy).
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of necessity, but as can be seen from a reading of the cases, necessity
is not actually a requisite to the validation of a search incident to
an arrest. The fourth amendment imposes substantive standards for
searches and seizures. It also establishes a procedure for effectuating
the rights of individuals-the deliberation of a dispassionate magis-
trate. The Court in undercutting the warrants clause of the fourth
amendment has caused the decline in importance of the magistrate,
and has made the initial arbiters of reasonableness the very people
who are most interested, the officers themselves. This could cause
substantial deprivation of liberty, since a convict may be required
to wait forever for Supreme Court review of his case, which is
currently the only effective control upon improper police practices.
IV CONCLUSION
Both the requirements of probable cause and reasonableness
find their basis in the long established principle of the right of
privacy, a concept whose roots reach deep in the private law of
property. 1
2
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic
to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause.183
In view of such a statement and the wording of the fourth amend-
ment that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, shall not be violated," it logically seems that the right of
privacy extends to such persons, houses, papers, and effects. How-
ever, due to the right of privacy being tied historically to property
law and the idea that "a man's home is his castle," 18" the majority
of Supreme Court cases stressing this right have dealt only with
the search of a person's residence without a search warrant.'85 To
182 See "Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment," supra note 176, at 667-78; Lasson, Development of the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution (1937).
183 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). See Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10 (1948).
184 Quoted in Lasson, op. cit. supra note 182 at 50. See Entic v. Carrington,
supra note 177.
185 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); McDonald v. United
States, supra note 139, at 453; Johnson v. United States, supra note 183. Cf. Gior-
denello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958), which was cited in Jones v. United
States, supra, for the proposition of the right to privacy. Giordenello is a case of an
arrest without probable cause for the warrant issued.
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this extent at least the right has been interpreted to require a magis-
trate to make an objective, independent decision as to probable
cause before a warrant may issue, with permission to invade privacy
therefore being the controlled exception rather than the general
rule.186
On the other hand, two cases recently decided by the Court,
tend to assert the view that the right of privacy and the require-
ment for a search warrant is limited to invasions pursuant to
criminal proceedings, and that an administrative search without a
warrant is not in violation of the fourth amendment. 8 7 A third case
permitted an extensive search pursuant to an administrative arrest
upon a warrant, which had been issued by an officer of the arresting
agency and not an independent magistrate.' s
Nevertheless, since the famous Warren-Brandeis treatise some
seventy-five years ago, 89 the right of privacy of the individual has
taken on an increasingly more important appearance in the United
States.190 Of the four torts evolving from this recognized right of
privacy only the first--"[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion
or solitude, or into his private affairs" 191 is of primary importance
in the area of search and seizure. In reality, is the invasion of the
person any less an invasion of his privacy under the fourth amend-
ment than the invasion of his home? The exposure of the individual
to an arrest or search incident thereto without an independent
magistrate's decision seems as unreasonable as a search of one's
residence without a warrant, from the point of view of invasion of
privacy. In Jones the Court suggested that the right of privacy
applied equally to the arrest in Giordenello192 where there was no
invasion of the home but merely an invasion of the person and his
effects.
Further, the intertwining of the fourth and fifth amendments
by the Court has been explained on the basis that:
186 McDonald v. United States, supra note 139; Johnson v. United States, supra
note 183.
187 Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, supra note 144; Frank v. Maryland, supra note
144. See "Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amend-
ment," supra note 176, at 666-78; Comment, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1960).
188 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
189 Warren & Brandeis, "The Right of Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
190 See Ezer, "Intrusion on Solitude: Herein of Civil Rights and Civil Wrongs,"
21 Law in Transition 63 (1961); Prosser, "Privacy," 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
191 The other three torts are: (2) Public disclosure of embarrasing private facts
about the plaintiff; (3) Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye; and (4) Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness. Prosser, supra note 190, at 389.
192 Supra note 185.
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The Fourth Amendment is generally a limitation upon enforce-
ment officers, and the privilege against self-incrimination is a limi-
tation upon prosecutors and trial courts. The former is ostensibly
to protect physical privacy; and the latter the privacy of one's
knowledge. Privacy is just as much and as unreasonably infringed
by the seizure of a document or a chattel as by compelling a per-
son to produce the same or to testify ... in such manner as to in-
criminate himself .... 193
An interesting parallel to the freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures of one's person, house, papers, and effects and
the right of privacy under the fourth amendment 9 4 may be drawn
with one's freedom of association and his resulting privacy of as-
sociation under the first amendment.
This Court has recognized the vital relationship between free-
dom to associate and privacy in one's associations.... Inviolability
of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly
where a group espouses dissident beliefs.19 5
Under these circumstances, it would be more consonant with
the wording of the fourth amendment and the present recognition
of one's right of privacy, that he be free from intrusion of the privacy
of his person, papers, and effects, as well as his house unless an in-
dependent magistrate or absolute necessity requires otherwise in
any particular case.
David C. Faulkner &
Robert I. Friedman,
193 Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures," 25 Colum. L. Rev. 11, 17 (1925). See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886).
194 The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every uniustifiable intrusion by
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the meanw em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion). (Emphasis
added.)
195 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 (1963) quoting
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
